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Articles
Jodn M. Kernochan* Statutory Interpretation:
An Outline of Method
I. Introduction
We are moving ever more surely and deeply these days into an age
of legislation.
In the past, judge-made law was the dominant feature, as it was
also the matrix, the fundamental and pervasive stuff, of our legal
system. Statutes were scattered islands in the ocean of common law.
For some time they were regarded by the courts as peculiar
incursions on the system, troubling the harmony of caselaw
patterns. A legislative enactment was seen, in the words of the late
Chief Justice Stone, as an "alien intruder in the house of the
common law." 1
But change has come and is currently at work at an astonishing
pace. The islands of legislation have become much more numerous;
they have become archipelagoes in some areas. The islands have
grown in size; some are almost continents. What once seemed a
peculiar incursion has become normal and pervasive. Statutes can
no longer be regarded as intruders. As more and more common law
is displaced, overlaid or supplemented, the system is becoming
legislative in character.
The operation of our legislatures shows what has been happening.
Like the legendary mill that is forever grinding salt at the bottom of
the sea, our legislatures have been regularly turning out a substantial
volume of new legislation to take its place in the law. For example,
in the United States during the two-year life of the 93d Congress
(1973-1974), there were introduced some 23,396 bills and joint
resolutions, of which 687 were enacted. 2 In the New York
legislature, 15,193 bills were introduced and 1,214 were enacted in
1971, and 7,777 bills were introduced and 1016 enacted in 1972;
*John M. Kernochan, Professor of Legislation, School of Law, Columbia
University
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delivered at the Dalhousie Law School, March 9, 1976.
1. H. Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936), 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at
15.
2. 120 Cong. Rec. D. 1427, D 1429 (daily ed. January 10, 1975).
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and this is only one of fifty states all of which are adopting new
statutes in great numbers. 3 In Canada also the legislative machines
are producing steadily.
Note that the process of legislating feeds upon itself. One statute
breeds more statutes. When a legislature passes a law it assumes a
new burden of responsibility (the more detailed the law the greater
the burden) for the updating and development of that law as policies
evolve or circumstances change or flaws are revealed. "Once begin
the dance of legislation," said Woodrow Wilson, "and you must
struggle through its mazes as best you can to its breathless end - if
any end there be."
4
The great growth in our statute law which results from all this
activity is of course reflected in the work of the courts. Some thirty
years ago, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reported that in the Supreme
Court of the United States the cases not resting on statutes were
"reduced almost to zero." 5 A check of one State Supreme Court in
1951-1953 showed the proportion of "common law cases
uninfluenced by statute" to be down to 38%.6 A count of recent
cases in the New York Court of Appeals shows about 60% turning
directly on statutes, with quite a few of the remaining cases
involving or referring to legislation.
While all this shows in some measure what is happening, it is the
way in which we are moving into this legislative age that is of
concern here. Compare with our legislative evolution the major
effort undertaken to prepare the German Civil Code, where an
overall view was adopted and a comprehensive enactment
developed with conscious attention to long-term viability and
flexibility and to the division of labour between courts and
legislators. 7 By contrast the change in our Anglo-American system
3. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 1974-75 (Lexington,
Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1974) at 84-85. The table shows that in the
two year period 1971-72 five states enacted more than 2000 statutes each, ten states
enacted 1000 to 2000 statutes each, nineteen states enacted 500 to 1000 each,
sixteen states enacted between 200 and 500 each.
4. W. Wilson, Congressional Government (Meridian Books ed., 1956) at 195.
This work was originally published in 1885.
5. F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (1947), 47 Colum.
L. Rev. 527 at 527.
6. A. Menard, Legislation and the Colorado Supreme Court - Techniques of
Statutory Construction (1954), 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 425 at 425-26.
7. See, e.g., A General Survey of Continental Legal History (Boston: Little Brown
& Co., 1912) at 446-451; E. Rabel, Private Laws of Western Civilization (1950),
10 La. L.R. 265.
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has tended to be almost casual, a piecemeal process that goes on act
by act. Until recently we have been backing into our legislative age,
one statute at a time, with our eyes firmly fixed on the past, on the
way we have always done things. We have been building up the
legislative part of our law in many instances through relatively
narrow, more or less detailed responses to particular problems,
without taking a general look at what it means to enter upon a
legislative system and how we should handle the problems this
poses. Such a mode of proceeding could well result, inter alia, in a
system difficult to manage because of the legislative burden and
insufficiently flexible for sound administration and development.
Surely, to cope effectively with a legislative system, we must
come to it face forward. We must reexamine many of the ways in
which we operate and make such changes as may be appropriate for
the needs of the new era. Many aspects of our making and
maintenance of statutes and of our application of statutes will
require to be restudied. Let us note some of these to set our main
topic in perspective.
For example, our drafting techniques should be reviewed with an
eye toward, among other things, the more effective use of generality
as a tool for delegating law development to courts and
administrators and gaining long-term flexibility. 8 Civil law
techniques and experience can be instructive on this subject. We
need also further study by draftsmen, legislators, legal scholars, and
social scientists of our means of making laws effective, i.e.,
sanctions. 9 And our machinery for the reform and revision of statute
law demands attention as the statutes multiply and the responsibility
of the legislature to keep them viable increases. Here the pioneering
efforts of Canada's Law Reform Commission and the labours of its
provincial commissions, as well as the work of the Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission in the United
Kingdom, fumish invaluable lessons and examples. 10 Again, in the
8. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (tentative ed. Cambridge, 1958) at 129, 720, 798-808.
9. See, e.g., H. Read, J. MacDonald & J. Fordham, Cases and Other Materials
on Legislation (2d ed. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, Inc., 1959) c. 7.
10. On the organization and operation of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
see, e.g., M. Friedland, The Work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada
(1972), 6 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 58 and J. Barnes, The Law Refoirm Commission of
Canada (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 62. Professor Barnes, discussing the English and
Canadian scene, observes (at 67): "Today we are beyond the point of having to ask
why we need permanent law reform agencies. We are now at the stage of
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United States, at least, we must look to our legislative processes to
see what can be done to make them more effective in dealing with
needed law reform and law revision and codification. Finally, there
is the vital matter of statutory interpretation. In this connection,
observe that, as statutes increase in number and scope, there will of
course be a greater incidence of conflicts to be adjusted between one
statute and another, of related statutes needing to be harmonized,
and of opportunities to make creative use of a statute's policy as a
premise for judicial reasoning in cases outside the statute. All these
developments deserve careful study. But the most urgent task facing
us in this area - and it is this subject to which the rest of this paper
is devoted - is the development of a sound general method of
statutory interpretation.
If we are embarked, as argued above, upon an age of legislation,
we must anticipate that the interpretation of statutes will account for
a very large and steadily growing part of the work of courts and
lawyers. 1 The extent of the role interpretation already plays in the
courts was suggested earlier. How well the courts discharge that
role has a great effect on the nature of the task of legislative
drafting, on the burdens and business of the legislature, and on the
effectiveness of legislative law and of the legal system as a whole.
In such circumstances, it is plainly imperative that we look hard at
our existing interpretative rules and approaches, and at their
adequacy, in preparation for the new age.
Looking at these rules and approaches today one finds a maze of
conflicting, mutually inconsistent prescriptions, a veritable jungle.
In the United States, for example, there are still vestiges of the plain
meaning approach alongside the dominant legislative intent
approach. Unresolved problems persist about the management of
considering how a law reform body should work in practice and what should be its
philosophy and function". On the Canadian provincial law reform commissions,
see, e.g., R. Gosse, Canadian Law Reform Agencies (1970), 1 Can. B. Ass'n J. 1;
W. Bowker, Alberta's Institute of Law Research and Reform (1968), 11 Can. B.J.
341, and L. Skene, The Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory Commission: An Early
Appraisal (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 201. On the British Law Commissions, see,
e.g., L. Scarman, Law Reform: The New Pattern (London: Routledge and Kegan,
1968); L. Scarman, Law Reform - Lessons from English Experience (1968-69),
3:1 Man. L.J. 47; L.C.B. Gower, Reflections on Law Reform (1973), 23 U.
Toronto L.J. 257; and J. Farrar, Law Reform and the Law Commission (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974).
11. The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation
of Statutes (Law Com. No. 2 1) (Scot. Law Coins. No. II) (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1969) at 3 [hereinafter cited as "Law Commission Report"].
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the intent approach. A sizable body of traditional maxims and
presumptions of doubtful weight and incidence still haunts us. It
was said harshly in 1958, and there is arguably truth in the statement
today, that "American courts have no intelligible, generally
accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation." 1 2 In the United Kingdom and Canada the literal
rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule still coexist and vie for
recognition in the cases although they may be argued to represent
inconsistent positions. 13 And again a body of questionable maxims
and presumptions is available to supplement these approaches. In
Canada and the United Kingdom, as in the United States, the
existing state of the law of interpretation has been roundly
criticized. 14
A way needs to be charted through this jungle. At the least, it
seems important to make the effort in this age and the effort seems
an undertaking appropriate to the energies and capacities of law
school faculties, situated as they are in a position to be heard by
those on the bench and at the bar and in a position to influence those
who will make and administer the law hereafter. 15 With these things
in mind, this paper undertakes to outline a method for the
interpretation of statutes, considering what the courts have done and
what some scholars have said about it. The aim is to provide a
sound, workable approach to a difficult, demanding job. If, within
the compass of this paper it is not possible to deal exhaustively with
all aspects of this complex, ramified subject, we will try nonetheless
to deal with its most important phases.
II. An Approach to Statutory Interpretation
Where does one properly begin the task and the method of
12. Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1201.
13. Law Commission Report, supra, note I I at 14ff. Compare E. Driedger, The
Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 2, 67, 81-82 arguing
from the cases that today the three rules named in the text have been fused into one
principle or approach.
14. As to Canada, see e.g., J. Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell (1938),
16 Can. B. Rev. I and J. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of
Statutes (1936), 1 U. Toronto L.J. 286. As to England, see Law Commission
Report, supra, note I I at 9 for criticisms by Allen, Lord Evershed, and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and at 17ff. for criticisms by the Commission itself.
15. Two recent treatises focus new and welcome attention on statutory
interpretation: Driedger, supra, note 13, and R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and
Application of Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975).
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interpretation of a statute? It may appear pedantic but let us say
anyway, at the outset, that one begins with mastering the facts and
reading the applicable statute as a whole and isolating the terms
which are in issue in relation to the facts. The necessity for close
reading of the words of a statute is basic. It is after all the obligation
to deal with an official unvarying text, promulgated by a superior
lawmaking authority, that gives statutory interpretation its special
character. Case-minded students and lawyers often find it difficult
to adjust themselves to the discipline that results from a fixed text.
16
Judge Friendly reports that Felix Frankfurter when a Professor of
Law had a threefold injunction to his students: (1) read the statute,
(2) Read the Statute, (3)READ THE STATUTE! 17 That injunction
is tied to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's trenchant observation that
interpretation is "confined by" if not "confined to" the words of
the statute18 - a notion to which we will recur.
Reading a statute is, however, a task with its own special
discipline. Certain premises and aims which are fundamental to a
sound method of interpretation must be kept in mind from the
beginning. We will speak of these directly, but before we turn to
them let us digress a moment to speak of an approach to the reading
of statutes that is excluded from the method here outlined. That is
the approach of the literal rule or, as we call it in the United States,
the plain meaning rule. Perhaps we can agree now, at last, to
eliminate this approach once and for all from the methods of
statutory construction.
1. Plain Meaning: The Literal Rule
Most of you will recall the terms of the literal rule. "If the
language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning,"
says Lord Atkinson in Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Society of
Compositors, '9 "the legislature must be taken to have meant and
intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear
terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or
mischievous results." He goes on to suggest that the language of the
provision being plain, the judges are "not concerned with the
question whether the policy . . . is wise or unwise or whether it
16. E. Griswold, Appellate Advocacy (1971), 26 Record 342 at 346.
17. H. Friendly, Benchmarks (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1967) at 202.
18. Frankfurter, supra, note 5 at 543.
19. [1913]A.C. 107 (H.L.).
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leads to consequences just or unjust, beneficial or mischievous."
The golden rule should be mentioned here also. Although the Law
Commission Report suggests it is really a form of the mischief
rule, 20 it seems much more closely tied to the literal rule in its
terms. It too speaks in terms of plain meaning, though it expressly
allows the courts to depart from the plain meaning under some
circumstances if to follow that meaning would produce a result so
absurd, or so inconsistent, as to convince the court that the intention
could not have been to use the words in their plain signification.
21
In the United States, a typical statement of the plain meaning rule
appears in Caminetti v. United States22 where Mr. Justice Day said
"where the language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." The
uncertain possibility of an exception to the plain meaning rule in the
event its application leads to "absurd or wholly impractical results"
is also referred to in the American cases.
2 3
The Report of the Law Commission and Scottish Law
Commission suggests that while some modification appears to be
under way the literal rule is alive and still a factor in
decision-making in the United Kingdom. 24 It is alive too, it seems,
in Canada. 25 A major change of attitude has, however, overtaken
the plain meaning rule in the United States. After a long period in
which the plain meaning rule coexisted with rules based on
legislative intent and the use of legislative history, the United States
20. Law Commission Report, supra, note I I at 19.
21. See the opinion of Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson,
[187712 A.C. 743 at 764-5. In Driedger, supra, note 13, c. 2, it is argued that the
cases show that departures from the plain meaning under the "golden rule" are
justified only when according that meaning produces some disharmony in relation
to the rest of the statute or to related statutes; such departures are not justified, it is
said, when the literal meaning merely produces consequences thought by the court
to be absurd.
22. (1917), 242 U.S. 470 at 485.
23. Id. at490.
24. Law Commission Report, supra, note I I at 5.
25. See, e.g., R. v. Maroney, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 306; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 257; 27
C.R.N.S. 185; Tupper v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 289; 63 D.L.R. (2d) 289;
[1968] 1 C.C.C. 253; R. v. Mojelski (1968), 65 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. C.A.).
Compare, Reference Re Certain Titles to Land in Ontario, [19731 2 O.R. 613; 35
D.L.R. (3d) 10 (C.A.). Compare also, Driedger, supra, note 13 at 61, concluding,
after consideration of English and Canadian cases, that the literal rule has been
modified, in that "today, the words of the Act are always to be read in the light of
the object of the Act".
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Supreme Court in 1940 in United States v. American Trucking
Associations26 used forceful language to repudiate the plain
meaning rule as a rule excluding resort to sources of interpretive aid
beyond the words of the statute. The Court stated: "When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its
use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination'." 27 Since that time, the Supreme Court has seemed to
mean what it said so forcefully. Although references to plain
meaning or literal meaning appear from time to time in the cases,
28
they are not used by the court to support exclusion from judicial
consideration of relevant statutory or non-statutory materials
bearing on the intent or purpose of the measure in question. And in
1974 in Cass v. United States29 the Supreme Court, when urged
anew by a litigant to apply the old exclusionary plain meaning rule,
reaffirmed in express terms the language of the American Trucking
case quoted earlier. But notwithstanding all this, the rule dies hard,
if it dies at all. A recent study by Professor Arthur W. Murphy
shows that, in the lower federal courts, for example, there has been
resort to the rule from time to time, even in its old exclusionary
form, in apparent disregard of the Supreme Court's position and
practice. 30 On June 1, 1976 the Supreme Court, citing American
Trucking and Cass, expressly ruled that it was error for a Court of
Appeals to have bypassed legislative history on the grounds of a
26. (1940),310U.S.534.
27. Id. at 544.
28. See, e.g. United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California (1953), 345
U.S. 295; Ex parte Collett (1949), 337 U.S. 55; and United States, Trustee v.
Oregon (1961), 366 U.S. 643. For a recent case referring to "plain meaning" see,
e.g., United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries (1975), 422 U.S.
271 at 281.
29. (1974), 417 U.S. 72. One could argue that the Court's remarks in this case
respecting the plain meaning rule were dictum, since it expressly noted that "the
question is sufficiently doubtful to warrant our resort to extrinsic aids".
30. A. W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts (1975), 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 1299 at 1304-05. See, e.g. Easson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(1961), 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.); Gilbert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(1957), 241 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.); Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co.
(1975), 509 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.); Mandel Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission
(1958), 254 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.); American Community Builders, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1962), 301 F.2d 7 (7th Cir.); and Heilman v.
Levi (1975), 391 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Wisc.).
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claimed "plain meaning".30a
There are many reasons why the literal or plain meaning approach
should be abandoned, along with the golden rule that builds on it.
Not least is the fact that the literal rule runs counter to the findings
of students of the symbolic aspects of language. Pitched as it is in
terms of the plain meaning of statutory words, it assumes that words
may have a single necessary meaning independent of their full
context, without regard to how those words were used. This is
dangerous and unwise. 31 At root, the literal approach puts the
wrong question. The question in human interchanges is not what the
words mean but what the user of the words meant by them. Given
the inexactness and imperfection of words as symbols in a world of
endlessly varied and shifting facts, to put the right question is
crucial. Words are means not ends.a 2 They are vehicles for the
transfer of thought from one human agency to another. A statute,
made up of these words, these vehicles, these means, is in
significant part a communication from the legislature to the courts
and other addressees. If the communication is to work well, the task
must be in the first instance to ascertain not what the words as words
mean abstractly or to the court or as a matter of common usage but
what the legislature sought to convey when it employed them. We
may decide later, when we have ascertained what was sought to be
conveyed, that the words can not fairly carry the meaning intended
but that is another issue, to be discussed later.
The need for asking the right question in interpretation is
underlined when one reflects on the difficulties a statutory
draftsmen faces when he must generalize with imperfect words in
framing a statutory rule to deal with an uncertain future. Questions
are bound to arise under any general direction, however well drafted
- questions of coverage, of unexpressed qualifications and the
like. Reliance on literal meaning is a wholly inadequate response to
30a. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (1976), 96 S. Ct.
1938.
31. C. Ogden & I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (8th ed. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946). And see generally on this subject, H. W. Jones, The
Plain Meaning Rules and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes
(1939), 25 Wash. U.L.Q. 2. Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in Towne v. Eisner
(1918), 245 U.S. 418 at 425, that "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used".
32. Note, Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts
(1952), 52 Colum. L. Rev. 125 at 134.
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the problems and efforts of the law-drafter and law-giver. 33 A
century ago, Francis Lieber gave an eloquent illustration of the
difficulties inherent in the giving of even relatively narrow
directions. 34 Professor Lieber's illustration richly repays reading in
its entirety, but for present purposes it will be enough to indicate
that he puts the case of a housekeeper handing some money to a
domestic and giving him the simple direction to "fetch some soup
meat." As he points out, this comparatively uncomplicated order
involves all manner of unstated assumptions, as for instance that the
domestic is not to delay, is to go to the usual market, is to buy
certain kinds of meat, is not to pay too much for the meat, is not to
add anything disagreeable or injurious, and so forth. The addressee
of a command, he shows, must always supply specifications drawn
from the context and it is always necessary for the order-giver to
rely on the addressee's common sense and good faith in doing so.
To carry Professor Lieber's case a step further, suppose that our
domestic comes to the market and finds - the hour being late -
that there is only spoiled meat left in the stalls. If he followed the
plain meaning rule, he would presumably "fetch the meat"
anyway, even though it is inedible. Would you not as employer feel
like dismissing such a domestic? He has failed to carry out the
simplest obligation of a communication situation. He failed to ask
about the purpose of the order, why the order was given - i.e., to
secure something to eat - and so he has made a useless expenditure
for inedible provisions. The problem is the same with statutes as it is
in such a case. A good faith, common sense effort to reconstruct the
context and purpose is essential. Literal meaning is a wholly
insufficient tool. As Judge Learned Hand said, "there is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally."- 35 And the
paralyzing effect of literalness is well known to labour unions and
used by them in so-called "by the book" strikes or in "working to
rule." Yet, in the complex, demanding task of statutory
interpretation, our courts persist in clinging to an approach which is
clearly intolerable even in the simplest situations of non-statutory
communication.
If the literal rule ignores the limits of language and the teachings
33. The literal rule breaks down, argues Professor Corry, in relation to general
propositions: Corry, supra, note 14 at 301.
34. F. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics (3d ed. W. G. Hammond, 1880).
35. Giuseppi v. Walling (1944), 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.) at 624 (concurring
opinion).
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of semantics and assumes unattainable perfection in drafting, 36 it
also conflicts with the fundamental principle of legislative
supremacy. Curiously, it is argued by some scholars that deference
to the legislature and the avoidance of judicial lawmaking are
reasons for adopting the literal rule. 37 It is assumed in some of these
cases that the only alternative is the exercise of an unwarranted
discretion. But the risk is that the meaning which seems plain or
ordinary to the deciding judge is not the one attached to the statute
by its enactors. That seems clearly to have been the result in the
Caminetti case cited earlier. 38 Why should the judge be permitted to
impose his own reference or that of some hypothetical average
person on statutory words instead of inquiring in the first instance as
to the reference of the enactors? Does it not seem obvious that a way
to minimize the risk of frustrating the legislative will is to pose the
question which is keyed to the legislative will, the question as to
what was meant or purposed by the legislators? The judge cannot
ensure that his reading does not contradict some reasonable
legislative reading of the words unless he canvasses the
possibilities. In any case, to pose and pursue the question of
legislative purpose is far from an exercise in uncontrolled
discretion. Recalling our problem of the domestic and the "soup
meat", and the nature of human communication, one can only
conclude that the interests of the legislature are being ignored and
signally disserved when its commands are taken literally.
39
The argument is sometimes made for the literal rule that its
application is necessary to assure certainty in the law. 40 Writing
thirty-eight years ago from the Dalhousie Law School, Professor
John Willis persuasively denied that the literal rule produces
36. See the criticisms of the literal rule in Law Commission Report, supra, note 11
at 17-19.
37. E.R. Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule (1937), 15 Can. B.
Rev. 689 at 696; Q. Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory
Interpretation (1954), 3 U. Kan. L. Rev. I at 13. Compare Corry, supra, note 14 at
312, where it is argued that the "supremacy of Parliament would not be shaken in
any way if the courts should throw off the spell of literalness".
38. (1917), 242U.S. 470.
39. Note that the criticisms of the literal rule apply to the golden rule insofar as the
latter builds on plain meaning. The latter rule is salutary to the extent it permits
results to be weighed by the court, but like the literal rule it rejects consideration of
legislative policy and so is also inconsistent with legislative supremacy.
40. See, e.g., George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co. (1929), 278 U.S.
245 at 253, where Mr. Justice Sutherland argues that failure to follow the plain
meaning would make a statute a "concealed trap for the unsuspecting".
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certainty. 4 1 The obvious difficulties of deciding whether a statute is
to be found ambiguous or unambiguous have been noted by other
writers. 4 2 How is one to foretell rationally whether a given
provision will strike a court as "plain"? Decisions arrived at by
"plain meaning" may in fact confound expectations .43 There are
even instances where judges have found different "plain meanings"
in the same statutory language. 44 Indeed, it has been suggested that
the characterization of "plain" or "ambiguous" is used by courts
as a device to achieve a result arrived at on some other basis, i.e., as
a screen for the imposition of judicial views. 45 Deciding cases on
grounds of "plainness" also means deciding them without hard
thought about underlying policies, without recourse to that reasoned
consideration and discussion of the substantive aspects of the
problem which alone can provide a base for the law to build on
soundly and which alone permit rational prediction for the future.
The discussion that characterizes plain meaning cases has been
labeled as "sterile verbalism.''46 Recalling our domestic and his
soup meat once more, one may ask whether certainty, or general
expectations, really can be served by the application of the literal
rule. Do not reasonable persons expect, should they not expect, that
interpretation will be dominated not by literalism but by a weighing
of purposes with good sense and good faith?
47
Our task here is to outline a method, an approach, for the
interpretation of legislation. So far, we have called for the reading
of the statute and digressed to say what our approach is not. We
41. Willis,supra, note 14 at 10.
42. See, e.g., C. Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes (1940), 24
Minn. L. Rev. 509.
43. See, e.g. Caminetti v. United States (1917), 242 U.S. 470.
44. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. (1951), 341 U.S.
384; and Ellerman Lines v. Murray, [1931 ] A.C. 126 (H.L.).
45. Willis, supra, note 14 at 11; Jones, supra, note 31 at 18.
46. Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1265.
47. In reflecting on the literal rule, note should be taken of the position adopted in
Driedger, supra, note 13. Professor Driedger here performs the heroic feat of
combining the three arguably inconsistent rules, the literal, golden and mischief
rules, with some modifications, into one approach which is described as "literal in
total context". Whatever basis this composite approach may have in the cases, it
seems of questionable value, given the arguments against the literal rule (text,
supra), to preserve certain vestiges of literalism in the resulting hybrid - for
example (a) requiring a difficult and pivotal determination as to whether or not "the
words are clear and unambiguous" and (b) stressing the "grammatical and
ordinary sense" of the words used when the question more appropriately is what
sense was intended by the legislature as indicated by text and context.
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have rejected the literal and golden rules with their dependence on
"plain meaning". Let us turn now to what the approach is. Our
discussion covers first the premises and aims of interpretation, then
the subjects of specific intent, purpose, and policy, and, finally, the
post-enactment aids, the maxims and presumptions.
2. Some Basic Premises
Before concrete steps are described for resolving statutory issues,
it is important to define some assumptions or premises that establish
a tone or direction and so condition what is to be done.
The first premise is the supremacy of the legislature. This
premise provides our fundamental interpretive guideline. It is a
constitutional tenet of our Anglo-American legal system that the
elected representative legislature is supreme in lawmaking, in the
shaping and declaring of major public policy. We have suggested
that the literal or plain meaning approach is inconsistent with that
tenet. It follows from that tenet that what the legislature has said and
tried to do are of paramount importance in the interpretation of
statutes. And this is the underpinning for the notion of legislative
intent, of Parliamentary will.
The second premise has to do with the function of the court in
interpretation. Here it is vital to repudiate any notion that the court's
function is a mechanical one, that the court is a robot automatically
applying all-sufficient legislative directions, that it is, as sometimes
urged in connection with the literal rule, not concerned with why the
legislature acted as it did or with the justice or injustice of the results
contended for. 48 Such notions are wholly inadequate in light of
what we have said about the difficulties of drafting and applying
general laws, with imperfect words and with imperfect foresight, to
cover endlessly diverse and changing facts for an indefinite future.
If even our domestic seeking "soup meat" must ask why and use
creative intelligence within the framework of his orders, how much
more important is it that a court do so in the infinitely more complex
and demanding task of construction that a statute may present. The
basic character of courts as organs for the reasoned development
and rationalizing of law has been eloquently described elsewhere
and it is pertinent here to reemphasize that character. 49 As a second
48. For an example of the consequences of judicial failure to consider these vital
questions, see Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co. (1902), 117 F. 462 (8th Cir.), rev'd.
(1904), 196U.S. 1.
49. Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8, especially 162-17 1.
346 The Dalhousie Law Journal
premise, then, it is proposed that the court look upon itself, and act,
as a kind of delegate or co-worker of the legislature. In this role, it
should be seen as responsible for applying the statute in an
intelligent, reasoned, sometimes even creative, 50 manner to the case
before it so that - within the leeways provided by the statute's
words and policies - it may make sense of that case and statute as a
part of the whole body of law. For this purpose the legislature
should be presumed in the absence of strong evidence to the
contrary to be a reasonable body intending reasonable results. To
propose a role for the court of the kind we have described is to call
for no more than any policy maker should normally expect from one
charged with applying his directives.
In relation to this second premise just described, recall Sir
Frederick Pollock's remark in 1882 that the methods of the English
courts in dealing with statutes "cannot well be accounted for except
upon the theory that Parliament generally changes the law for the
worse, and that the business of the judge is to keep the mischief of
its interference within the narrowest possible bounds." 51 How
much difficulty might have been avoided if the courts had seen
themselves not as contestants or resisters of the Parliament but as
delegates or co-workers, cooperating with the legislature in
evolving just law for society within the framework of a statute and
its purposes. The importance to interpretation of our second premise
cannot be overestimated.
3. The Objective
With these two basic premises noted, it is necessary to speak next
of the aim of interpretation as that will shape our method. The aim,
as everyone knows, is generally described as the ascertaining and
effectuating of the legislative intent - the will of Congress, the will
of Parliament. The courts have often affirmed this formula, 52 which
flows from the premise of legislative supremacy. It merits some
attention.
Note that the concept of legislative intent has been much
criticized. It has been labeled a "fiction" 53 and called
50. See generally text, infra, at notes 89-98.
51. F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London: Macmillan & Co.,
1882) at 85.
52. For a recent example, see Philbrook v. Glodgett (1975), 421 U.S. 707 at 713.
53. M. Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930), 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 at 869-70; J.
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"beclouding. ' ' 54 "[A] composite body," it is said, "can hardly
have a single intent."' 55 Even if such an intent exists, it has been
argued that it is undiscoverable and, if discoverable, irrelevant.
56
But these epithets and arguments are too extravagant. It may be
granted that the concept of legislative intent is fictional if it is meant
to suggest that all or most of the legislators voting for a statute share
the same views of the detailed applications of the statute's
provisions. But it seems probable that the majority legislators in
voting at least agreed as to general purposes or assented to the
purposes of others. The action of a composite body in enacting
legislation is surely purposive. To deny this would be to deny the
worth or validity of legislative functioning. 57 And it is not necessary
to insist on unanimity of all or most members of the legislature or of
its majority. It is practicable and realistic in relation to purposes and
even to details of legislation that the views of those to whom the
legislators delegate responsibility should be taken as standing for
the views of the legislature. 58 Evidence is often available to show
general purposes; the views of the responsible parties can often be
traced. The premise of legislative supremacy supports the relevance
of such material.
The concept of legislative intent draws an analogy between the
will of a single person and the will of the body. It is acceptable if it
is recognized that the analogy is rough and that "intent" must carry
a special sense in its application to the group. 59 Beyond this the
concept has the virtue of referring the court to a guide outside its
own subjective judgment. It suggests a goal, 60 attainable to a
degree, and calls for an interpretive attitude that acknowledges the
Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes (1954), 32
Can. B. Rev. 624 at 625; Driedger, supra, note 13 at 82.
54. Frankfurter, supra, note 5 at 538.
55. Willis, supra, note 14 at 3. See also Corry, supra, note 14 at 290; Johnstone,
supra, note 37 at 14; Driedger, supra, note 13 at 82.
56. Radin, supra, note 53 at 870-2.
57. Note, supra, note 32 at 126.
58. Corry, supra, note 53, argues that judicial reliance on the views of a few to
stand for the many is judicial lawmaking. Compare Judge Hand's discussion in
Securities Exchange Commission v. Collier (1935), 76 F.2d 939 and see J. Landis,
A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930), 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 at 888-889 and
H. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts (1940), 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737 at
743-750.
59. Dickerson, supra, note 15at78-79.
60. A. Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes (1947), 60
Harv. L. Rev. 370 at 372.
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role of the legislature. Some scholars prefer to abandon the concept
of intent and to substitute an "objective" concept of legislative
purpose so as to avoid the suggestions of subjective design thought
to inhere in the term "intent." 6 1 In this latter view, purpose is to be
elicited from the Act and its context, not from the minds of
legislators. But intent is a concept which has historically been used
and is still in use in the courts. It is viable if it is steadily recognized
that intent must be related to the enacted words of the statute, that
one must be on guard as to the attenuated sense of the term when
foresight is limited or nonexistent, and that aside from judicial
notice of pertinent social facts, it is generally to be established from
the text and documented context. Whichever rubric is adopted -
legislative intent or "objective" purpose - the role of the
legislature's purpose, as far as we can establish it, is preeminent. In
the end, if the problems are understood and articulated, the
difference in these rubrics does not seem to be one of overriding
importance.
4. The Text
Let us return now to the actual task of interpretation. We began
by urging that the words of the statute be read in relation to the facts
of the case. They must be read in light of the assumptions or
premises stated and of the objective of carrying out the will of the
legislature. In reading a statute for interpretive purposes the first
task is to comb its face for evidence of the intent with which the
pertinent words were used. Note that our earlier rejection of the
"plain meaning" approach was not meant to suggest that the text is
anything other than the principal element in the interpretive effort.
Normal usage and consistency provide starting points for appraising
the sense, subject to conditioning by the context. The precise words
61. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, supra, note 5 at 538-539 speaks to this point:
"Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that
policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the
statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what
the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to be led off the trail by tests
that have overtones of subjective design. We are not concerned with anything
subjective. We do not delve into the minds of legislators, or their draftsman or
committee members". And again: "The purpose which a court must effectuate is
not that which Congress should have enacted or would have. It is that which it did
enact, however unjustly, because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute
..... See generally, Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1410-1417.
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which are in issue in relation to the facts must be weighed in the
light of successive circles of context. The provision in question
must be read in the setting of surrounding provisions, of the Act as a
whole with its title and any preambles or declarations of policy.
From this the interpreter must formulate "working hypotheses" as
to the intended purpose and meaning of the Act. He is to avoid final
judgment in most cases at this stage and, as we said, is not to think
in terms of a plain or literal meaning. The working hypotheses or
tentative judgments are then to be tested against wider circles of
context which may include - in the United States - the internal
legislative history of the provision. These circles embrace also the
preenactment history of legislation and other law on the subject,
with the light this may shed on the evil to be remedied. They
encompass relevant surrounding legislation and caselaw. Even
postenactment legal developments may have a bearing.
5. Specific Intent
We have said that the text and its surrounding contexts are to be
combed for evidence of intent. Dean Landis distinguished two
senses of intent:62 first, intent in the sense of meaning, or specific
intent, which is applicable when the legislature specifically foresaw
the problem in issue and meant to resolve it in a certain way;
second, intent in the sense of the general purpose or aim behind the
legislation. The search of text and contexts just described is a search
for evidence of both of these kinds of intent.
If in the search of text and contexts highly persuasive evidence of
a specific intent is found, controlling weight should normally be
accorded to it. For example, the language of the act may be quite in
point and supported, or not contradicted in any way, by the
contexts, and the purpose and sense. Or, in the United States, the
search of contexts may turn up legislative committee reports or
debates or other materials which show the legislature had the
particular problem in view and sought to deal with it in one fashion
or another. While in such cases the specific intention thus found is
generally to be followed, this is subject to limitations imposed by
the words used in the Act. In a situation where the evidence of
specific intent or purpose would require that the words be given an
62. Landis, supra, note 58 at 888 and see Jones, supra, note 58 at 740-741 and
Cox, supra, note 60 at 370-371. The distinction has also been made by the courts,
as in California v. Buzard (1965), 382 U.S. 386.
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unlikely meaning and affected persons reading the statute might be
misled to their injury, the unlikely meaning cannot be attributed to
the statute. An interesting case, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Acker, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 195963, came close
to such an issue. In the Acker case, the defendant had failed to file a
declaration of estimated tax as required by the taxing statute. One
section of the statute prescribed additions to the tax in the event of
such a failure and these were assessed. But the Commissioner also
sought to collect under another section [294(d)(2)] which provided
for an addition to the tax in the case of a "substantial
underestimate" of tax. The majority declined to rule that a failure to
file an estimate - separately and expressly penalized as such -
was also to be treated as a substantial underestimate. They refused
to give controlling weight to a Congressional Conference Report
and administrative regulation stating in terms that, in the event of
failure to file, "the amount of the estimated tax for purposes of
[294(d)(2)] is zero." Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented vigorously,
relying on the Conference Report to justify the unlikely meaning
and the additional penalty. The case shows that the language used
may - especially in a penalizing situation - limit the impact of
extrinsic evidence of intent. Note too, particularly in connection
with older statutes, that unforeseen circumstances arising after
enactment might well affect the persuasiveness of such evidence.
The likelihood that persuasive evidence of a specific intention
will be found is of course reduced by rules such as those prevailing
in Canada and the United Kingdom which exclude Hansard from
judicial consideration in interpretation6 and limit judicial use of
Royal Commission Reports. It is not proposed to consider at length
here the pros and cons of the exclusionary rules, as these have been
extensively discussed in the Canadian Bar Review.6 5 Let it be said,
63. (1959), 361 U.S. 87.
64. Gosselin v. The King, 11903] 33 S.C.R. 255; Assam Railways and Trading
Company v. Commissioners ofInland Revenue, [1935] A.C. 445 at 457-459 (H.L.)
(per Lord Wright). Compare the position taken in various Continental jurisdictions,
as discussed in H. Gutterridge, A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statute
Law (1933), 8 Tul. L. Rev. 1, and in the United States, text at notes 69-76.
65. D. G. Kilgour, The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History: Canon of
Construction or Counsel of Caution (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 769. [See on this
article, letter of J.T. MacQuarrie (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 958; letter of Kilgour
(1953), 31 Can. B. Rev. 1087; and, letter of J. Milner (1953), 31 Can. B. Rev.
228]; K. Davis, Legislative History and the Wheat Board Case (1953), 31 Can. B.
Rev. I [See on this article, letter of J. Milner (1953), 31 Can. B. Rev. 228]; Corry,
supra, note 53.
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however, that Professor Corry's 1954 lecture at Dalhousie66
rejecting all parliamentary materials as unworthy seems to go much
too far. It is difficult for example to understand why the minister
whose department sponsored a bill and who pilots it through the
House of Commons is not to be considered a reliable spokesman
67
or why Royal Commission Reports should not be freely looked to.
One may regret that the Law Commission and Scottish Law
Commission though calling for wider use of extrinsic sources,
determined to stand by the existing rule as to Hansard. 68 The
problem of isolating reliable information in Hansard to which the
Commission referred is surely not insuperable if one locates the
responsible spokesmen. The problem of availability would surely be
solved by public or private initative if the rules were changed. In the
United States, in the federal courts, there is now a long tradition of
resort to so-called internal legislative history materials. Recognizing
the key role standing committees play in the U.S. legislative
process, federal courts have made extensive use of the published
reports of such committees.69 The records of committee hearings
are sometimes cited.70 Remarks made in floor debate - especially
by responsible committee spokesmen - may be referred to,
71
though the courts have had some difficulties here, 72 and doubts
persist as to the reliability of the Congressional Record. 73
Conference reports are consulted, 74 as also are messages of the
executive. 75 In sum, the full range of legislative history materials is
called upon for interpretive aid at the federal level. 76 In using such
materials, the courts have shown some grasp of the realities of the
legislative process. 77 They have demonstrated, again and again, a
capacity to weigh evidence drawn from that process even as they
66. Corry, supra, note 53.
67. Davis, supra, note 65, and letter of Milner, supra, note 65.
68. Law Commission Report, supra, note II at 36.
69. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892), 143 U.S. 457.
70. O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 364.
71. Gossnell v. Spang (1936), 84 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan (1955), 225 F.2d 417 at 426-427 (2d Cir.)
(Hand J., dissenting); United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc. (1956), 351
U.S. 305.
73. Neuberger, "The Congressional Record is Not a Record", New York Times
Magazine, April 20, 1958, reprinted at (1958), 104 Cong. Rec. 6816-6818.
74. Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co. (1959), 359 U.S. 290.
75. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1904), 196 U.S. I.
76. Jones, supra, note 58.
77. SEC v. Robert Collier & Co. (1935), 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.).
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weigh other kinds of evidence. In the states, by and large, there has
been willingness to consider extrinsic materials but many kinds of
aids available at the federal level - standing committee reports and
hearings, floor debates, conference reports - are not generally
available at the state level. The practice of the United States courts
with relation to internal legislative history sources has not gone
unchallenged at home and debate persists over the availability and
reliability of such sources and whether the costs and burdens of
consulting them are justified by the results. 78 But there is today no
discernible disposition in the Supreme Court to retreat from or
reconsider the rules that permit recourse to internal legislative
history materials. Behind this attitude, one may venture, is a belief
tested by experience that such materials provide significant insights
into legislative intent and into the social purposes behind
legislation.
Even with the full range of legislative history to draw from,
however, it must be stressed here that difficult cases are not
resolved with great frequency by extrinsic evidence of specific
intent. And it is, of course, a mistake to treat the search of contexts
as a search in which preexisting specific answers must be found for
interpretive questions.
79
78. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Jackson's article, The Meaning of Statutes: What
Congress Says or What the Court Says (1948), 34 A.B.A.J. 535 and his concurring
opinions in Schwegmnann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. (1940), 341 U.S. 384 at
395 and United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California (1953), 345 U.S.
295 at 319. See also C. Curtis, It's Your Law (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1954) at 52. Most recently Professor Dickerson in chapters 9 and 10 of his
work on statutory interpretation, supra, note 15, has joined the attack on the use of
internal legislative history sources. He defines "context" rigorously to exclude
such sources. This definition is contrary, however, as he notes, to "the view now
prevailing among liberal American jurisprudes"; it is contrary also to the view
taken in this lecture. Apart from the concept of "context", Professor Dickerson
urges that the benefits gained from consulting internal legislative history do not
justify the costs and inconvenience that result from thus vastly multiplying the
research materials that must be combed for counseling, advocacy and other
purposes. To appraise such an argument, a more extensive investigation of the
practical experience with the use of such material would seem to be needed. Note
that Professor Dickerson acknowledges, in any case, that at least some of these
sources may properly be considered in relation to judicial lawmaking in the
application of statutes. For a sampling of the literature favouring use of internal
legislative history, see, e.g., Landis, supra, note 58; Jones, supra, notes 31 and 58;
Davis, supra, note 65; Note, supra, note 32; C.D. Breitel, "The Courts and
Lawmaking" in M. Paulsen, ed., Legal Institutions Today & Tomorrow (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959) at 29-32. Compare Hart & Sacks, supra,
note gat 1284-1286, 1415-1416.
79. W. Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation (1965), 38
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6. Purpose
By all odds, the most important harvest to be reaped from the
study of a statute and its context is normally a more generalized
sense of what the legislature was trying to do, why it did what it did.
We are speaking here of legislative purpose which represents the
second aspect of intent and is surely the most significant factor in
the interpretive process. That we must take account of purpose in
every communication situation was suggested earlier in our
discussion of Francis Lieber's case of the domestic sent to "fetch
soup meat." Legislation, like other utterances, is a purposive act
and the effort must be to reconstruct the purpose that propelled the
lawgivers if meaning is to be assigned faithfully and intelligently. In
every case the interpreter is to look for this animating principle and
reason from it. Even if evidence of a specific intention is available,
the legislative purpose is still vital as a check on that evidence and
as a guide to its use.
The central role of purpose in interpretation has been amply
acknowledged. "The general purpose," said Mr. Justice Holmes,
"is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down." 80 And this view of the
importance of determining and relying on purpose is now widely
shared by judges 8' and scholars. 8 2 Courts have frequently used the
purpose approach. 83 Recently, the Law Commission and Scottish
Law Commission recommended that a construction which would
So. Cal. L. Rev. 1.
80. United States v. Whitridge (1935), 197 U.S. 135 at 143.
8 1. Frankfurter, supra, note 5; Cox, supra, note 60.
82. See, e.g., Landis, supra, note 58; Corry, supra, note 14; Jones, supra, note
58; and H. Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention (1940), 40 Column. L.
Rev. 957; Hart and Sacks, supra, note 8, especially at 1410-1417. J. Witherspoon,
Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle Road": I
(1962), 40 Texas L. Rev. 751 summarizes the position of the so-called
"middle-road" scholars favouring purpose interpretation. In The Essential Focus
of Statutory Interpretation (1961), 36 Ind. L.J. 423 at 433, Professor Witherspoon
commented: "The great bulk of 'middle road' scholars have always insisted that
relevant legislative purposes must be carefully regarded in administration of
statutes. In light of the rather universal legislative, administrative and judicial
practices obtaining today in this country concerning the operation of legislative
purposes, the war concerning the role of legislative purposes in administration has
been won by these scholars". Driedger, supra, note 13 at 81, proposing a hybrid
approach to interpretation, lays stress on ascertaining the object or purpose of the
Act in every case.
83. For an excellent illustration of a case resting on legislative purpose, see
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1904), 196 U.S. 1.
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promote the legislative purpose underlying a provision should
always be preferred in interpretation to one which would not.
8 4
With so substantial a concurrence of views, one may hope that the
courts will definitely forego the seductive appeal of "plain
meaning" and will turn in every case to interpretation in accordance
with intent or purpose. 
85
How to interpret in accordance with purpose was aptly described
almost four centuries ago in the resolutions in Heydon's Case
outlining what is known today as the mischief rule. 86 It calls, in
essence, for analysis of the prior law, the mischief to be remedied
and the remedy enacted and then, on the basis of the "true reason of
the remedy" as thence derived, it demands such an interpretation as
will suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The general
purpose, or "true reason of the remedy" as thus developed provides
a basis for inferences to resolve the specific issue. The statute itself
and its scheme are prime sources for purpose; then the wider circles
of context mentioned earlier. Note that the need for and validity of
the search for purpose along the lines proposed in Heydon's Case
are not affected by the unavailability of legislative history materials.
To be sure, Hansard or Congressional documents or debates may
provide valuable evidence for such a search. But the question as to
purpose is the appropriate question in every case whatever may be
84. Law Commission Report, supra, note II at 51.
85. Lord Denning M.R. in a recent case has observed "[w]e no longer construe
Acts of Parliament according to their literal meaning. We construe them according
to their object and intent": Engineering Industry Training Bd. v. Samuel Talbot
(Engineers) Ltd., [ 1969]2 W.L.R. 464 at 466 (C.A.).
86. Heydon's Case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a at 7b; 76 E.R. 637 at 638 (Ex.) phrases
the mischief rule as follows:
And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: -
Ist. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges
is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of
the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico.
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the resources (perhaps only the statute itself) to answer it.
The task of establishing purpose is of variable difficulty. Perhaps
it is not hard to determine that the purposes of an anti-speeding
statute are safety and order on the highway. And the statute itself
may contain, in a preamble or title or declaration, some statement of
its own purpose which may be used if it is in harmony with text and
context and pertinent to the problem in hand. But the determination
of purpose in accordance with Heydon's Case or otherwise may
often be a complex undertaking. Occasionally, the statutory purpose
and the statutory issue are so interwined that one must in effect
resolve the issue in order to frame the purpose. And purposes exist,
as has been said, in "hierarchies and constellations." 87 One can see
something of the flexibility of purpose, and of the judgments
involved, from Professor Radin's example of a statute declaring that
gambling contracts are void. He points out that the purpose may be
narrowly stated as one "to make it impossible to sue on gambling
contracts" (or to make their gambling character a defence); or it
may be more broadly stated as a purpose "to discourage
gambling." In the background, he points out, are the vaguer, more
general purposes of law: justice and security. 88 It can easily be seen
from this that the determination of purposes to aid in resolving
statutory issues will often demand a creative effort by the courts.
7. Policy
The insight that interpretation, though based upon legislative
intent, may yet involve an originative judicial contribution is of
critical importance. That insight is not, to be sure, a new one. Mr.
Justice Cardozo has cautioned us that "codes and statutes do not
render the judge superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and
mechanical." "Interpretation," he said, "is often spoken of as if it
were nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which,
however obscure and latent, had none the less a real and
ascertainable pre-existence in the legislator's mind. The process is,
indeed, that at times, but it is often something more." '8 9 Others
have pursued the same point. 90 Professor Corry warns, "In many
87. Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1414. See generally the excellent discussion of
the methods and problems of inferring purpose at 1410-1417.
88. Radin, supra, note 53 at 876-77.
89. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1921) at 14-15.
90. See, e.g., Corry, supra, note 14 at 291-292; Jones, supra, note 82 at 970-972;
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cases, there is no logical compulsion on the judge to accept a single
meaning; two or more possible meanings are open to him. In
making his choice, he makes law in spite of his protests to the
contrary. " 91
We must take into account, then, in developing a candid, viable
method of interpretation that the interpreting judge will be called on
to act as a lawmaker rather than a lawfinder in many situations.
Some statutes, by virtue of their generality, or otherwise, clearly
contemplate judicial creativity. 92 As one moves away from specific
intent, and as issues are shaped by legislative failure to deal with
particular cases, or by new and unforeseen circumstances, there
may be no question of legislative foresight in any meaningful sense.
Or the evidences of specific intent may give rise to significant
dilemmas. Or - as in the Acker case discussed earlier 93 - the
tension between the words used and the indicia of intent may give
rise to doubts and issues beyond intent. Resort to purpose will
resolve many of such problems, and that avenue must of course be
explored. But as appears from the preceding.discussion of purpose
there is often leeway in defining purposes or in their selection from
among various alternatives and from various levels of generality or
in their application to the issue at hand. In the Acker case, for
example, the purpose of supplying adequate penalties to ensure the
filing of proper tax declarations and estimates would be largely
satisfied by either of the two competing readings of the statute.
Where such leeway remains, legislative choices must be made by
the courts, and that step must be frankly reflected in the method we
are evolving. The existence of such choices should not be more
surprising or distressing here than it is in a common law setting.
When the judge acts as legislator, making choices not determined
K. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed (1950), 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 at
400-401; Breitel, supra, note 78; C.D. Breitel, The Lawmakers (1965), 65 Colum.
L. Rev. 749 at 765-772. See also Dickerson, supra, note 15, at c. 3 (see especially
footnote 5 at 14 and materials there cited) and c. 12. Professor Dickerson treats
"cognition" (ascertainment of meaning) and "creation" (judicial lawmaking) as
distinct, major aspects of the adjudication of statutory issues. Note that the
lawmaking aspect of the treatment of statutes is largely passed over in the Law
Commission Report, supra, note 11, and hardly discussed in Driedger, supra, note
13.
91. Corry, supra, note 14 at 291. Professor Corry observes: "No science of
legislation or interpretation can ever eliminate this creative work of the judge".
92. Breitel, supra, note 78 at 15-22.
93. (1959), 361 U.S. 87.
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by evidence of intent, what does sound method require of him?
What is to guide his choices? In broad terms, his effort must be a
disciplined one: to read the statute so as to make the best possible
sense of it in the developing legal and social context, in a manner
consistent with the terms of the statute and with purposes reasonably
attributable to it. The considerations beyond intent to be weighed in
making this effort we may label "policy" or "public policy." In
weighing policy, the court will be acting much as it would act in a
common law case when there is no binding precedent. Thus, as in
such a case, its striving to reach a wise decision, to do justice,
should be informed, inter alia, by due regard for consequences -
i.e., the social advantage of one result as against another. It should
be informed by due regard as well for custom, for general
community expectations, for general principles and for such related
caselaw and legislation as may be pertinent even though not
binding. 94 And presumptions, such as the penal statutes rule, may
merit attention. 95 Of course, the more the court can be enlightened
as to the relevant societal facts and legislative policies the more
effective will be its lawmaking. 96 Yet even as we recognize the
latitude for all these considerations, we must stress again a point we
have just noted - i.e., that lawmaking in the statutory setting must
be harmonized with the statutory framework and with a rational
purpose attributed to the statute. The leeway for the courts is
confined. There is no intention here, of course, to disparage judicial
use of statutes by analogy in cases beyond their terms, but that is
another subject for another time and place.
Courts are not always aware or candid about the role of "policy"
or "public policy" in their decisions under statutes or elsewhere,
97
but we must urge that this role be articulated if it is to be realized
properly and criticized effectively. Advocates, too, are remiss, and
thereby contribute to judicial omissions. All too often those arguing
94. See generally, Cardozo, supra, note 89.
95. See infra, notes 115-6 (penal statutes rule). See the ensuing discussion of other
presumptions.
96. Jones, supra, note 82 at 974.
97. Long ago, Mr. Justice Holmes complained: "I think that the judges themselves
have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial
aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and
foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious .... ":The Path of
the Law (1897), 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 at 467. Compare Cardozo, supra, note 89 at
117-119.
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statutory cases do not sufficiently grasp their opportunities to argue
"policy" to the courts - and to bring societal facts to their notice
so as to help them make sense of the law within the leeways they
have. Arguments of social advantage, for example, are not pertinent
only to the definition and selection of purpose where obvious choice
exists. They are often pertinent more broadly to the task of weighing
the evidence of intention, whether specific intention or purpose, and
deciding the questions of degree that enter into the final attribution
of intent. Courts are apt to say in interpretation that the wisdom or
unwisdom of results they reach is of no consequence. And yet such
wisdom or unwisdom may shed important light on whether or not it
is reasonable to attribute a particular specific intention or purpose to
the legislature. We have argued elsewhere that legislatures should
be assumed in interpretation to be reasonable bodies not intending
unreasonable consequences unless such an intent is clearly shown.
This is surely implied by the court's responsibility to act as good
faith delegate or co-worker of the legislature which we have
described as a premise of interpretation.
We have now set out the basic outlines of a method of
interpretation: the assumptions, the objective, the scrutiny of the
text and contexts for specific intention and purpose and the
weighing of policy in light of which the interpretive question is to be
resolved. 98 Certain matters, however, remain to be considered,
including the treatment of prior judicial, administrative and
legislative constructions, and including the familiar maxims of
interpretation and presumptions.
8. Prior Constructions
How are prior judicial interpretations to be treated under the
method we have been discussing? Note that when a court construing
a statute is confronted with a relevant earlier decision by the same or
a higher tribunal, the earlier decision injects another element of
authority into the interpretive process. Courts have a fondness for
their own handiwork. Inevitably there is a risk that this new element
of authority will be given more weight than is proper, at the expense
of the legislative intent and purpose we have been stressing. If, for
example, the earlier decision is in some measure at odds with intent
or purpose, and if the judicial eye is trained wholly or mainly upon
98. For a judicial opinion embodying in large part the method here proposed, see
FTC v. Sun Oil Co. (1963), 371 U.S. 505.
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it, a slight initial error may like a navigator's fault be extended as it
is pursued. The divergence between interpretation and intent may be
compounded. To bar such results it is necessary that the method we
have described be followed in every case, whether or not precedent
exists. The statutory framework of text and intent is always
paramount. Each new issue must be resolved in harmony with that
framework. Precedent is to be followed only as that framework
permits. Within the framework, of course, precedent is vital. The
methods of dealing with precedent are very similar to those
applicable in a common law setting, though the courts here,
conscious of treading in legislative domains and hedged by fixed
statutory terms, may see themselves as less free to rework, more
bound to follow, their own past precedents. When a prior ruling is
challenged as inconsistent with legislative intent and the question is
whether to overrule, the wrongness of the earlier decision must be
weighed in the balance with the policies supporting stare decisis. It
follows, however, from what we have said earlier about intent and
the role of the court as delegate or co-worker that the courts should
hesitate to cast upon a heavily burdened legislature the responsibil-
ity for correcting judicial errors regarding intent when the courts
could reasonably make the correction themselves. 99 The arguments
of legislative "adoption" sometimes made to bolster prior judicial
interpretations are not compelling without a clear showing of
legislative awareness and endorsement. 100
When A court is confronted in interpretation with a prior
administrative construction of the statute, the administrative
construction must, again, be dealt with in a manner consistent with
legislative intent and text. Such constructions do nevertheless
involve special considerations. In the United States, administrative
rulings are commonly treated as meriting some deference based on
the position of the agency among the institutions of government.
Like judicial constructions, they are post-enactment expressions and
so cannot be taken, without more, as evidence of the enacting
legislature's intent. It may be however that, by reason of the
agency's participation in the drafting or enacting process, its
interpretation is based on a special knowledge of that intent and so
can be viewed as shedding light thereon. 101 Absent such special
99. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States (1946), 328 U.S. 61 at 69-70.
100. Cleveland v. United States (1946), 329 U.S. 14 at 22-24 (Rutledge J.
concurring); Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1394-1405.
101. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns (1940), 310 U.S. 534.
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knowledge, an agency construction represents some evidence of
what in the circumstances constitutes a reasonable interpretation of
the statute. Its weight may be bolstered by the deference already
mentioned or by considerations drawn from any pertinent expertise
the agency may have 102 or, in the case of settled administrative
interpretations, by considerations of stability and reliance.
0 3
Arguments of legislative "adoption" are no more compelling for
administrative interpretations than for judicial rulings.
With the progress of the legislative age and the growing
pervasiveness of legislative law, we may anticipate an increase in
situations where the legislature after adoption of a statute acts in
some way that amounts to a legislative interpretation of its own
enactment. Thus, it may make a declaration as to the meaning of the
earlier statute, 10 4 or it may adopt an amendment, 10 5 or a further
statute, '0 6 which involves assumptions about the construction of the
earlier measure. How is such a legislative construction to be treated
by a court later seeking to interpret the same act in accordance with
legislative intent as we have proposed? The intent evidenced by the
later legislative construction is obviously to be differentiated from
the intent of the enactors of the original Act. The later intent can
generally be given effect for the future, of course. In the United
States, however, insofar as its effect on the past is concerned, the
later expression of intent must be tested against constitutional rules
prohibiting certain types of retroactive legislation. 10 7 When such
rules do not bar the way, the later expression of intent may be
applied to the original Act if the intent to affect the past is clear
enough to overcome the ordinary presumption against such a result.
Even in areas where retroactivity is barred, the legislative
construction may be accorded weight by the courts as evidence of a
reasonable construction - a weight strengthened by deference to
the legislature's position in the lawmaking process.
9. Maxims
In our quest for a sound method of statutory interpretation for the
legislative age, what is to be done with the so-called maxims or
102. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service (1947), 330 U.S. 649.
103. Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States (1933), 290 U.S. 256.
104. See, e.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc. (1958), 358 U.S. 84.
105. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press (1954), 347 U.S. 522.
106. See, e.g., Flora v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 145.
107. See, e.g., on this problem, FHA v. The Darlington Inc. (1958), 358 U.S. 84.
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canons of construction to which courts have resorted in the past and
which persist in the cases - maxims such as eiusdem generis,
noscitur a sociis, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the maxim of
consistency, the maxim of the last antecedent, and so on? These
maxims are not necessarily related to the search for legislative intent
which we have suggested forms the core of interpretation. On the
face of it, they are mechanical in character and may call for a
particular construction of particular verbal configurations without
regard to the nature of the problem involved, or to the context or to
the sense of the result. Nor are such "rules of thumb" necessarily
consistent with ordinary practice in the use of words.
Consider eiusdem generis, for example, which says that when
general words appear in conjunction with an enumeration of
particulars, the general words are to be limited to the class of things
indicated by the particulars. Insofar as this maxim (or noscitur a
sociis, to which it is related) directs the interpreter to read words in
their context, it is unexceptionable and echoes our earlier insistence
on that step. The decision as to what class the particular or
associated words define, and whether the term in issue must indeed
conform to the class, cannot however be automatically determined
as the maxim would seem to suggest. That decision must depend on
the setting. In United States v. Alpers s08 there was a statutory
prohibition against depositing with a carrier for transmission in
interstate commerce "any obscene .'.. book, pamphlet, picture,
motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of
indecent character." The startling argument - startling to
nonlawyers, that is - was made that since the particular terms
included only articles the public could see or read, the general term
"other matter of indecent character" should by the rule of eiusdem
generis be restricted to such articles and could not include obscene
phonograph records. A majority of the Court understandably
rejected this argument. On the other hand compare the Mann Act,
the so-called White Slave Traffic Act, involved in the Caminetti
case. 1Orhis notorious statute penalizes those who transport women
across state lines for "prostitution, debauchery or any other
immoral purpose." Here, by contrast, it might be appropriate, and
not startling, to apply the eiusdem generis maxim to limit the
obviously overbroad general phrase - "any other immoral
108. (1950), 338 U.S. 680.
109. Caninetti v. United States (1917), 242 U.S. 470.
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purpose" - to sexual immorality and to exclude, for instance, a
man who transports a woman across state lines to serve as his
accomplice in a holdup.
Related difficulties attend the expressio unius maxim. The notion
expressed in this maxim is sometimes appropriate, and sometimes
not, in human communication. The sign DON'T WALK that
appears on New York street corners when the traffic light turns red
is clearly not to be taken as exclusive, i.e., as allowing pedestrians
to run across the street against the traffic. By contrast, one will
quickly find, if one experiments, that the signs that say MEN or
WOMEN on our washrooms are most definitely to be taken as
excluding the sex not mentioned! In sum, the maxims do not of
themselves yield sound results. Whether in speech or in statutes the
context must be consulted to see if the path they indicate is
appropriate. Given this unreliability, it is not surprising to learn that
for most of the maxims counter-maxims can be found in the
cases. 1
10
What is the utility of these maxims, then? They do serve at least
one important function - particularly for the draftsman, advocate
or counsellor. They identify recurrent types of ambiguity. The
existence of a maxim dealing with a certain type of verbal problem
warns us that such a problem is a common source of interpretive
difficulties. We are on notice that doubts will frequently arise in
relation to general terms associated with other words in enumeration
(eiusdem and noscitur) or in relation to negative implications
(expressio) or consistency (rule of consistency) or the effect of
modifiers (last antecedent).
It has also, been urged that, provided they are not treated as rules,
the maxims may be useful devices in that they indicate, for
particular types of verbal difficulty, one linguistically permissible
solution which may be applied when the context warrants."1 This is
well enough. But they have in fact from time to time been treated as
rules by commentators 112 and courts' 13 and there is a serious risk
that they will be so applied, without regard to context or intent, by
the naive or lazy or the calculating. If used in this way, they may
110. Llewellyn, supra, note 90 at 401-06.
111. Hart & Sacks, supra, note 8 at 1220-1222, 1412.
112. See, e.g., Willis, supra, note 14 at 7-8. Compare, Driedger, supra, note 13
at 9 1, affirming that ejusdem generis is "not a rule of law".
113. See, e.g., Taylor v. Michigan Public Utilities Comm'n (1922), 217 Mich.
400; 186 N.W. 485.
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defeat all our painstaking prescriptions for sound method in
interpretation. 1 14 They should probably be added to W.S. Gilbert's
"little list" of things that "never would be missed." In the end, the
least we can do about these maxims in preparing for the legislative
age is to insist that they be clearly labeled and treated as
non-mandatory. We must require that they be invoked, if at all, only
after a full investigation of intent, with analysis of contexts, shows
that their use is appropriate in the particular case.
The rule of consistency warrants a special mention. In working
with a statutory text in the first stage of interpretation it may not be
unreasonable to assume, tentatively, that the words of the Act are
used consistently. A good legislative draftsman will normally strive
for consistency, this being one of the most important devices
available to him to control meaning. But achieving perfect
consistency is very difficult, and human failures abound, so that
again legislative intent in context should govern rather than an
inflexible mechanical rule.
10. Presumptions
A final element to be weighed in relation to our method of
interpretation consists of the various presumptions which have been
evolved and applied by the courts in construing legislation. Though
they are phrased as presumptive of intent they are really policies of
the courts and may in some cases run counter to intent. Unlike the
verbal maxims we have just considered, which are essentially
neutral in terms of substantive policy, the presumptions commonly
embody judicial conclusions as to where the weight of decision is to
be thrown in cases relating to particular kinds of subjects.
One example of a presumption familiar in United States law is the
oft-stated doctrine that penal statutes are to be strictly construed -
i.e., construed in favour of defendants. Originating long ago as a tool
of nullification of over-severe criminal laws, this doctrine is perhaps
somewhat less needed today. Underlying the doctrine, as explained
by Mr. Justice Holmes in McBoyle v. United States, is the notion
that "fair warning" should be given before individuals are
penalized.115 That notion may be most apt when the conduct in
question is not normally seen as seriously wrong. But there is
beyond this a persistent social view, reflected sometimes by the
114. Dickerson, supra, note 15 at 229.
115. (1931), 283 U.S. 25.
364 The Dalhousie Law Journal
courts, that the government ought as a general matter to have to
"turn square corners" before visiting any punishment on its
citizens. These underlying policies find expression at the
constitutional level in the United States in the due process
requirement of definiteness. 
116
Another familiar presumption affirms that a statute is presumed,
in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary, to operate
prospectively.'1 7 There are of course, as earlier noted, various
constitutional limitations in the United States on the retroactive
operation of statutes - prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, as well as prohibitions against impairing the
obligation of contracts and, based on due process, against
interference with vested rights. In areas where legislation may
constitutionally be given retroactive effect, the presumption may be
applied to avoid retroactivity. Like the constitutional prohibitions, it
reflects, though at a subconstitutional level, a policy of fairness, of
avoidance of probable hardship especially where there may have
been reliance on prior law.
Among the many other presumptions, which are too numerous to
catalogue exhaustively here, 1 8 mention may be made of a
notorious one to the effect that "statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed." 11 9 Historically, resort to
this presumption by courts in the United States often manifested
hostility to legislation. Apart from such hostility it could also be
argued to represent - along with the presumption that repeals by
implication are not favoured 20 - a general policy in favour of
maintaining certainty and stability by preferring existing law. This
maxim is not frequently encountered today and its decline probably
stems from a growing and welcome hospitality in the courts toward
legislative innovation.
116. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960), 109 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 67.
117. See, e.g., Weiler v. Dry Dock Savings Institution (1940), 258 App. Div. 581;
17 N.Y.S. 2d 192.
118. For discussion of many of the presumptions operative in English and
American law see, e.g. Willis, supra, note 14 at 17-27 and Driedger, supra, note
13, c. 9.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co. (1902), 117 F. 462 (8th Cir.),
rev'd (1904), 196 U.S. 1. The canon is discussed at length in J. B. Fordham and J.
R. Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law (1950), 3
Vand. L. Rev. 438.
120. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari (1974),417 U.S. 535.
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These judicial presumptions of which we have been speaking
have some importance and impact in statutory construction. It is
apparent that some of them - for example, those addressed to penal
statutes and prospectivity - are quasi-constitutional in character 121
and reflect fundamental social policies. Yet the incidence of the
judicial presumptions is uncertain and the courts do not apply them
rigorously or uniformly. It is often difficult to tell what weight is
accorded them when they are used, as they often are, in conjunction
with other arguments. And there exist conflicting presumptions. For
example the "strict construction" presumptions may be opposed by
the doctrine that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. 122
Are not most statutes remedial? When equal and opposite
presumptions exist in this way, their application may be a matter of
judicial discretion and predictability suffers.
What disposition is to be made then of these presumptions? As
noted, they may have little relation to the legislative intent or
purpose which we have stressed as the touchstone of interpretation.
Indeed the serious danger - illustrated by the presumption about
statutes in derogation of the common law - is that they will be used
unjustifiably to frustrate intent. It is vital to insist that such
presumptions should not be applied before the legislative intent is
fully and fairly determined from a study of text and context as we
have earlier proposed. They are not to be substituted out of hand for
that determination, or for a decision based thereon.1 23 But when
doubt remains after resort to the indicia of intent, or sometimes
when legislative desires are not clearly enough expressed, these
presumptions may nonetheless represent significant policies to be
weighed in the balance with other policies' 24 and given a place in
decision-making.
III. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, let us revisit a certain few points among
many.
121. Willis, supra, note 14 at 17 and 23, argues that use of certain presumptions
amounts to a sort of common law "Bill of Rights". Such devices may be more
important in jurisdictions where there is no written constitution guaranteeing basic
rights.
122. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co. (1904), 196 U.S. 1.
123. For a case in which maxims and presumptions were rejected in favour of
intent or purpose, see Gooch v. United States (1936), 297 U.S. 124.
124. Text, supra at note 95.
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We have called for an end to literalism. We have called for
adherence to legislative intention as the aim of interpretation. Text
and context are to be combed for evidence of intent. When there is
convincing evidence of a specific intention, we have said, that is
normally to be followed, but the legislature's purpose remains the
primary and most usual guide. We have called for the ascertainment
and weighing of legislative purpose in every case as the chief step in
interpretation. Interpretive issues are generally to be resolved in the
light of purpose, but any evidence of intent is of course subject
always to the limits set by the words of the statute. In many
decisions, we have acknowledged, public policy will play a
significant role which needs to be articulated.
The trend away from literalism in the cases and the swelling
chorus of scholars and judges in favour of purpose interpretation
give some hope of accelerating change in the directions we have
thus indicated. Fortifying the argument for such change is the fact
that our overriding concern with intent and with purpose seems
consistent with the nature of words and human communication. It
is, moreover, consistent with fundamental assumptions of legisla-
tive supremacy. Finally, it is in harmony too with our vision of the
proper role of courts in the realm of statute law. Let us close by
reinvoking this vision. The vision is an inspiring one surely, fit to
replace the grudging, negative one of the era of literalism. It is a
vision to be kept always before us and to inform all our interpretive
efforts - the vision of courts and legislatures as constantly
cooperating partners in the development of just law for a just
society.
